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Preface
Whether because of my foolish confidence or flawed character, Professor Pears is the
only person I asked to provide feedback and guidance while writing my thesis. Thus, it is to her
that I am uniquely grateful. Professor Pears, thank you for your comments and feedback which
were always cogent and never tiresome. Thank you for your candor in discussing this project
and others. Thank you for your support and encouragement. And above all, thanks for letting
me sit in your office for way too much time, not only this semester but in semesters prior and,
hopefully, after this one.
There are many points about the various subjects in this paper I probably should have
included but could not. I intend to correct that mistake, and I am grateful to the Salvatori Center
for a grant that will help me continue my research in 2019 and, perhaps, beyond.
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Abstract
The most contentious issues of our day often have to do with political and social rights as
opposed to economic rights. Through the lens of property rights I investigate whether this
dichotomy existed at the time of the American founding. First, I examine the state constitutions
and identify three clauses, common to the documents, which protect property rights. I examine
their historical basis and reveal their connection to English common law and Locke, primarily.
Then, I discuss the personal views of Madison and Jefferson to gain insight into the personal
thoughts of two of the most influential Founders. Finally, I examine the actual protections for
property rights found in the Constitution and Bill of Rights. Ultimately, I conclude that the
Founders saw property rights as deserving no less protection than social and political rights. Our
modern political arena thus has a blind spot when it comes to economic rights. Understanding, at
the very least, this part of our nation’s original history is useful for American policymakers,
advocates, and citizens of any political stripe.
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Introduction
Just as New York City has Central Park, Washington, D.C. has the National Mall.
Running 1.9 miles along the Potomac River, it is anchored by the Lincoln Memorial at one end
and crowned by the Capitol Building at the other. Behind the Capitol, however, sits my favorite
building in the city, the Supreme Court of the United States. Classically styled and far less busy
than the “currency” buildings across First Street, its broad checkerboard plaza is quiet most days,
and the Court only receives the public for business a small number of days per year.
I waited outside the Supreme Court in that quiet (and cold!) at 6:00 AM on November 29,
2017 to hear the oral arguments in Carpenter v. U.S. The petitioner, Timothy Carpenter, was
arrested and charged with burglary after the government obtained cell phone records from his
cell service provider that proved he was in the area of the robberies at the time they occurred.
Before the court on November 29th, his attorneys argued that the government’s use of the cell
phone records, obtained under the “reasonable suspicion” standard, constituted a warrantless
search, which would have required the FBI to provide “probable cause,” a more exacting
standard.1 The case was, in effect, about what government actions were prevented by the Fourth
Amendment’s guarantee of “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects,” a political right protecting citizens from being unfairly convicted of a crime. 2
The Supreme Court was neither quiet nor cold on June 26, 2015, when the justices
legalized same sex marriage nationwide via the 5-4 Obergefell v. Hodges decision. On the same
marble plaza, gay rights advocates and demonstrators celebrated what they viewed as an overdue
protection of the social right to marry for all people regardless of sexuality. Justice Anthony
1

Orin Kerr, “Supreme Court agrees to hear ‘Carpenter v. United States,’ the Fourth Amendment historical cell-site
case,” The Washington Post, June 5, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2017/06/05/supreme-court-agrees-to-hear-carpenter-v-united-states-the-fourth-amendment-historicalcell-site-case/.
2
U.S. Const. amend. IV
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Kennedy, writing for the majority, cast the case as an issue of personal freedom saying, “No
longer may this liberty be denied,” and that the ruling would guarantee for same sex persons
“equal dignity in the eyes of the law.” 3
Today, political and social rights dominate our nation’s public debates. The most
important issues of the 21st century - criminal procedure, same sex marriage, campaign finance,
affirmative action, abortion - center on the extent of individuals’ rights to act in a certain way, to
say a certain thing, or to participate in communal governance in a certain way. Economic rights
- those rights which enable a person to improve his or her own economic situation and keep the
benefits of his or her labor for personal enjoyment - such as property rights, rights to contract,
and labor rights are rarely discussed in popular politics. Even the 2018 case Janus v. AFSCME,
which asked if a non-union employee could be forced to play union dues, was argued on the
basis of 1st Amendment freedom of speech protections - a political right.4
This emphasis is present in all branches of government, not just the judicial branch. A
Pew survey conducted during the 2016 federal election cycle found that 72% of voters
considered gun policy “very important” with 74% saying the same of health care policy. 5
Progressive Bernie Sanders went from a dismissed independent to a serious threat in the
Democratic primary in part by recasting access to health care as a human right. 6 After alt-right
provocateur Milo Yiannopoulos was prevented from speaking at UC Berkeley, President Donald
Trump suggested withholding funding from higher education institutions that did not adequately

3

Adam Liptak, “Supreme Court Ruling Makes Same-Sex Marriage a Right Nationwide,” The New York Times,
June 26, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/supreme-court-same-sex-marriage.html.
4
Adam Liptak, “Supreme Court Ruling Delivers a Sharp Blow to Labor Unions,” The New York Times, June 27,
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/us/politics/supreme-court-unions-organized-labor.html.
5
“Top voting issues in 2016 election,” Pew Research Center, July 7, 2016, http://www.peoplepress.org/2016/07/07/4-top-voting-issues-in-2016-election/.
6
Bernie Sanders, “Bernie Sanders: Why We Need Medicare for All,” The New York Times, Sept. 13, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/opinion/bernie-sanders-medicare-single-payer.html
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protect free speech. 7 In Congress, too, after the nomination of Judge Brett Kavanaugh to the US
Supreme Court, the rights of sexual assault survivors and of the accused became the pivotal
issues discussed in his Senate confirmation hearings. 8 Even when our political branches talk
about issues of economic rights such as taxation policy, the main justifications for policy change
are not rights-based. Instead, we are told that our economy will improve or jobs will be created.
Was desegregation ever called for on the grounds that it would increase profits for lunch
counters?
Was this dichotomy of rights always present in our nation’s history? In particular, when
our country was founded, what did those great men think about the proper place of economic
rights relative to political and social rights? It may have been the case that political and social
rights were considered less important (or at least were discussed less frequently), but if it was
not, this reveals a blind spot in the American polity today. Uncovering that blind spot and filling
in the missing content should be a project important to anyone who thinks about American law
and politics. Lawyers, policymakers, commentators, voters, and citizens alike will benefit from
understanding the position of economic rights at the time of our founding.
For America’s conservatives, reinforcing the principles of the Founders is clearly
important. It is conservative orthodoxy that “the Constitution and its principles are grounded in
human nature, which is the unchanging ground of our constantly changing experiences,” 9 and it
is therefore both useful and right to continue to apply those principles today. Even those who do
not believe we should be bound to our country’s starting principles find it useful to understand
7

Teresa Watanabe, Peter H. King, and Hailey Branson-Potts, "Could Trump really cut funding to UC Berkeley? It
would be very difficult,” Los Angeles Times, February 2, 2017, https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-trumpberkeley-20170202-story.html.
8
Christine Hauser, “The Women Who Have Accused Brett Kavanaugh,” The New York Times, Sept. 26, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/us/politics/brett-kavanaugh-accusers-women.html.
9
Charles Kesler, “What’s Wrong with Conservatism,“ AEI, June 8, 1998, http://www.aei.org/publication/whatswrong-with-conservatism/print/.
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what those principles and our original character were. For instance, Ronald Dworkin proposed
that judges engaged in Constitutional interpretation first derive from text and history the “moral
principles about political decency and justice” ingrained in the Constitution and then attempt to
apply those principles to the specific case in question.10 This interpretive method can facilitate
case results opposite those derived by originalist and likely conservative judges. However,
judges and politicians employing Dworkin’s method would still require in the first place a deep
understanding of the political principles of our founding. This is the case today: President
Barack Obama, applauding the Court for recognizing the previously-undiscovered Constitutional
right to same sex marriage in Obergefell, began by saying, “Our nation was founded on a
bedrock principle that we are all created equal.” For Obama, this principle was rightly
recognized in the specific case of marriage equality. 11 Liberals and conservatives both will
benefit from a better understanding of our founding principles.
That my discussion of economic rights in our modern political arena has largely centered
on court cases should not be taken to imply that I mean for the following analysis to only apply
in matters of law. Understanding the Founders’ conception of economic rights is essential to any
American wishing to engage in the polity. Forming an understanding of this topic would
represent a small step towards answering the two essential questions that our Founders, and their
antecedents going back millenia, put forth for us and our posterity: What sort of life is worth
living? And, given that, what sort of political regime is worth living under?
My project is far more limited than attempting to answer those questions explicitly.
Indeed, I will not even address how the Founders saw all economic rights. Rather, I will focus

10

Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1996), 2.
11
Steven T. Dennis, “Obama Transcript: Statement on Same-Sex Marriage Supreme Court Ruling,” Roll Call, June
26, 2015, https://www.rollcall.com/news/obama-transcript-sex-marriage-statement.
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on the property right as it is the most concrete, ancient, and easily definable of the various
economic rights. Over three chapters, I will attempt to uncover to what extent the Founders
valued property rights, especially relative to other social and political rights, and how they
attempted to protect property rights in our federal Constitution.
In Chapter 1, I will discuss protections for property rights in the various state
constitutions that preceded the US Constitution. Antecedent to the federal Constitution and often
written by the same men who constructed our nation’s incorporating document, the state
constitutions served as natural foundations off of which to base the content of the federal
Constitution. In examining the state constitutions, I identify three clauses common across many
states and trace those clauses’ history through British common law and times prior.
In Chapter 2, I will discuss the political thought of two of the most influential Founding
Fathers: James Madison and Thomas Jefferson. While none of these great men can stand in for
the political thought of all of the Founders, which was not monolithic, it is the case that they
were two of the most important Founders and left an identifiable impact on the Constitution.
In Chapter 3, I will turn my attention to the US Constitution itself and discuss alongside
its explicit text the Constitutional Convention, ratification period, and Bill of Rights. A work of
political theory itself, the creation of the Constitution was informed by the threads I identify in
Chapters 1 and 2. It was, and remains, the supreme law of our land and understanding its content
and the debates that surrounded its creation and ratification is most important for understanding
the Founders’ conception of property rights.
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Chapter 1 - State Constitutions
230 years after the Founding, it’s easy to forget that in the late 18th century, each state
was its own very powerful government. The balance of state and federal power then was
profoundly different, and state constitutions would have been the most important documents for
residents of the 13 states, as the U.S. Constitution is today. Additionally, for a citizen worried
about potential government encroachments on his natural rights, it was the state constitutions to
which he would turn for protection, not any federal governing document. Thus, it is useful to
look at how property is treated in the various state constitutions, which served as the natural
predecessors to the federal constitution.
The state constitutions mention property, and they do so in common ways. The first
manner in which they are mentioned is that enjoyment and attainment of property is a basic,
natural right essential for the pursuit of happiness. The second idea is that government is
prevented from taking private property for public use without an owner’s consent or that of his
legal representative. Third, trial by jury is seen as “sacred” or deserved in cases involving
property. Finally, the state shall not engage in limitless searches and seizures of person or
property. I will examine each of these clauses in more depth.

Property Rights as Natural Rights
The first discussion of property present in many state constitutions is the idea that
property is a basic and natural right possessed by all men. The Bill of Rights of the State of New
Hampshire, adopted June 2, 1784, says in its second article, “All men have certain natural,
essential, and inherent rights among which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty;
acquiring, possessing, and protecting, property; and, in a word, of seeking and obtaining

12

happiness.” A key question in our investigation is the position of property rights relative to more
commonly discussed political and social rights. In New Hampshire, at least, it’s apparent that
property rights were on par with other broad rights of “enjoying and defending life and liberty.”
In other important state documents, legislators used similar language to describe property
rights. Virginia, the most populous state in 1790, said in its Declaration of Rights, “all men are
by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights… namely, the
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing
and obtaining happiness and safety.” Again, its early inclusion in the Declaration of Rights of
the largest state in the nascent union emphasizes the importance of property as a primary natural
right.
The Founders established the right to property, among others, amidst a well-documented
doctrine of natural rights . Thomas West claims that the genesis of the American natural rights
doctrine developed as a way to justify self-rule against the British government. Evidence of a
basic theory of natural rights dates back to 1717. Starting in 1725, West says, American
publishers printed summaries of John Locke and the natural rights doctrine strengthened. Later,
as British rule became increasingly tyrannical, states adopted natural rights as a political tool to
push for self-rule as the Massachusetts legislature argued that some of the guarantees of the
British constitution were of rights “derived to all men from nature” and thus could not be
violated by Parliament.12
State constitutions echo this language. . Many states base their guarantee of rights in the
notion that the nature of men is “equally free and independent” (Virginia) 13 or that “all men are

12

Thomas G. West, The Political Theory of the American Founding, (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2017), 21-22.
13
“Virginia Declaration of Rights,” The Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, Accessed Dec. 11, 2018,
http://www.history.org/almanack/life/politics/varights.cfm, clause 1.
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born free and equal” (Massachusetts).14 In the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson based his
claim of natural rights explicitly in a higher being, famously writing that “all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights.” 15 All of this
language follows in the tradition of John Locke, who used a two-part appeal to “the law of
nature,” reason, and God, “one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker.” 16
When rights were naturally-derived, Founders believed, they could never be given away.
The Declaration of Independence and state constitutions characterize natural rights as
“unalienable”17 and that “when (men) enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact,
deprive or divest their posterity” of such rights. 18 This implies the highest protection - if a right
can never be given away, it can certainly never be justly taken away. By declaring property
rights to be natural rights, states also declared them inalienable, eligible and deserving of the
strongest protections against any future government encroachment.
The three-part division of natural rights presented by New Hampshire and Virginia - of
enjoying liberty, acquiring property, and obtaining happiness - is present in founding documents
from Massachusetts,19 Pennsylvania, 20 and Vermont.21 In the state constitutions, however, there
are differences in how rights are presented, which imply differing views on how these three
natural rights interact with one another. In Pennsylvania and Vermont, the state constitutions

14

“Massachusetts Constitution,” Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Accessed Dec. 11, 2018,
https://malegislature.gov/Laws/Constitution, Art. I.
15
Declaration of Independence
16
John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, edited by C.B. McPherson (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company, 1980), web, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/7370/7370-h/7370-h.htm, Sect. 6.
17
“ Massachusetts Constitution,” Art. I.
18
“Virginia Declaration of Rights,” Clause 3.
19
“Massachusetts Constitution,” Art. I.
20
“Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights,” in The Founders’ Constitution, edited by Philip B.
Kurland and Ralph Lerner, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), web, http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_of_rightss5.html, clause 1.
21
“Constitution of Vermont - July 8, 1777,” Avalon Project, accessed Dec. 11, 2018,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/vt01.asp, Ch. 1 Clause 1.
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present enjoyment of life and liberty, the acquisition, possession, and protection of property, and
the pursuit and obtainment of happiness in a list, one after the other. The natural reading of these
documents is that each right listed is an equal right that is deserved by citizens of the state and
that there is no distinction between any right.
In New Hampshire and Massachusetts, the last right, to pursue and obtain happiness, is
presented as a summation of the first two rights. New Hampshire’s constitution reads, “...and, in
a word, of seeking and obtaining happiness,” 22 and Massachusetts’ constitution says, “...in fine,
that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.” 23 Under this arrangement, it is
certainly the case that a citizen of New Hampshire or Massachusetts would have been entitled to
the three natural rights listed above to the same extent as a citizen of Pennsylvania or Vermont.
However, the presentation of the right to pursue and obtain happiness makes the claim that the
rights to enjoy life and liberty and to acquire, possess, and protect property are constituent rights
instrumental to the broadest natural right of pursuing and obtaining happiness. The preface to
the final right acts almost as an id est postscript, following up on the first two rights to explain
that what men are really entitled to is the pursuit and obtainment of happiness.
Delaware eschews the broad proclamations of natural rights endorsed by the other states.
Its Declaration of Rights says simply “that every member of society hath a right to be protected
in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property.”24 This is a much briefer protection of the rights
listed above and does not include a mention of pursuing or obtaining happiness, as other states
do. Delaware’s brevity also means its document contains no justification for the natural rights

22

“State Constitution - Bill of Rights,” New Hampshire, Accessed Dec. 11, 2018, https://www.nh.gov/glance/billof-rights.htm, Art. 2.
23
“Massachusetts Constitution,” Art. I.
24
“Delaware Declaration of Rights,” in The Founders’ Constitution, edited by Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), web, http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_of_rightss4.html, sect. 10.
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listed as other states do. This omission is interesting in the context of the rest of the Delaware
Declaration of Rights, which holds as a primary concern free practice of the Christian religion.
Section 2 says that “all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God,” and
Section 3 guarantees “that all persons professing the Christian religion ought forever to enjoy
equal rights and privileges in this state,” among other things. That Delaware does not mention
God as the source of natural rights may indicate a view on the matter to the contrary or a strong
dedication to total state neutrality towards religion.
All of this analysis is presented to demonstrate the varied views on the natural right to
property that existed in state constitutions prior to the creation of the US Constitution. In some
states, these protections were detailed, including protections for acquisition, possession, and
protection of property. They were also based in a doctrine of natural rights which implied that
they could never be violated or relinquished to the government. In other states such as Delaware,
the protections were shorter, protecting simply “the enjoyment of… property.” 25 However,
despite the diversity of opinions about how much protection citizens should have for their
property, it was accepted across the nation that protection of property was one of the primary
reasons for establishing government and was thus important to protect under a state constitution.

Trial by Jury
The second idea found in every state constitution examined is the requirement for trial by
jury in civil and criminal cases. For instance, the Constitution of Pennsylvania, in its Declaration
of Rights, states that “in controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man,
the parties have a right to trial by jury, which ought to be held sacred.” 26 State constitutions

25
26

“Delaware Declaration of Rights,” sect. 2-3.
“Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776,” Clause XI.
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required trial by jury for a variety of matters because they realized that the court system could be
used to strip citizens of their property, whether through a criminal or a civil trial. Having
endured such abuses themselves, they wished to prevent the practice in their own states, and did
so through the state constitutions.
Henry G. Connor, a judge on North Carolina’s Supreme Court and a federal district court
judge in the early 1900s, locates the origins of American insistence on trial by jury in the ancient
Magna Carta.27 Clause 39 of the 13th-century Magna Carta says, “No free man shall be seized
or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his
standing in any way, nor will we proceed with force against him, or send others to do so, except
by the lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land.” 28 Thus, trial by jury has a long
legacy as a legal principle stemming from one of the earliest declarations of rights.
Blackstone echoes and expands on this legacy in his Commentaries, writing that trial by
jury, among other processes, “is as antient as the common law itself.” 29 Blackstone, too, credits
the Magna Carta as an ancient source calling for trial by jury but also cites the Holy Roman
Emperor Conrad who, in the 11th century decreed that “no one shall be deprived of his property
but according to the custom of our predecessors, and by the judgment of his peers.” 30 Trial by
jury is a tradition maintained for almost a millenia. Blackstone says that trial by jury was also
employed in feudal systems in Germany, France, and Italy, where juries were composed of other
vassals or tenants of the local lord. In those systems, the emphasis was on filling the jury with
27

Henry G. Connor, “The Constitutional Right to a Trial by a Jury of the Vicinage,” University of Pennsylvania
Law Review 57, no. 4 (January 1909): 198, accessed December 11, 2018, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3313928.
28
“English translation of Magna Carta,” British Library, July 28, 2014, https://www.bl.uk/magnacarta/articles/magna-carta-english-translation#.
29
“Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England Book the Fourth - Chapter the Twenty-Third: Of the
Several Modes of Prosecution,” Avalon Project, Accessed December 11, 2018,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/blackstone_bk4ch23.asp, pg. 305.
30
“Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England Book the Third - Chapter the Twenty-Third: Of the Trial by
Jury,” Avalon Project, Accessed December 11, 2018,
“http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/blackstone_bk3ch23.asp, pg. 350.
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12 good men of equal status so that when a lord was being tried himself, the jury was filled with
12 other lords of the land.31 The historical legacy of this practice, which Blackstone argues
produces the fairest outcomes for men at trial, would have been important to the Founders.
Educated, well-read in the classics and history, it’s likely that they would have been appreciative
of the impartial outcomes produced by trial by jury, if not aware of the history as Blackstone
was.
Blackstone also explains the merits of trial by jury and its importance for protecting
property. “The impartial administration of justice, which secures both our persons and our
properties,” he says, “is the great end of civil society.” While the ruling class is well-equipped
and well-trained to administer justice, “in spite of their own natural integrity, will have
frequently an involuntary bias towards those of their own rank and dignity: it is not to be
expected from human nature, that the few should be always attentive to the interests and good of
the many.” Thus, trial by jury of peers is essential to the preservation of a man’s liberty, person,
and property because of its inclination to impartiality, which cannot at all times be expected from
a bench trial.
The protection of trial by jury would have been important to the Founders because, at
times, it was endangered when the states were colonies of England. Connor explains that in
1768, Tudor-era treasons created “by a truculent Parliament to gratify the changing ecclesiastical
and matrimonial whims of the King” were invoked against the American colonists. 32 To do so
would have been a significant breach of the protections afforded by trial by jury. For one, the
accused would have been tried in front of “twelve Englishmen, in no true sense of the word his

31
32

“Blackstone - Of the Trial by Jury,” pg. 349.
Connor, 205.
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peers.”33 Remember that juries are structured to maximize the potential impartiality of the jurors
judging a case. Englishmen, distant and different, would not have fit this description in the trial
of an American colonist. Second, “to poor men, as most of them were, transportation to England
at best meant ruin.”34 King Henry VIII originally employed this tactic to punish and control his
enemies: “an act was passed empowering (Henry VIII) to appoint commissions for the trial of
persons accused of treason at any place in the realm that the King should designate,” 35 explains
Connor. This could be used to punish people by stalling their economic activity or to deter
people from speaking or acting out with the threat of a faraway trial.
The proposal to charge Americans in this fashion “excited a fierce and legitimate
indignation in America, and added a new and very serious item to the long list of colonial
grievances.”36 Americans internalized the danger that a ruler or executive could use the location
of the trial to intimidate or punish a man only accused, not convicted. Indeed, the charge was
listed as an offence in the Declaration of Independence; independence was justified “for
depriving us in many cases, of the benefit of Trial by Jury” and “for transporting us beyond Seas
to be tried for pretended offences.” 37 Clearly, the violation of the sacred right to trial by jury,
first established in the Holy Roman Empire, guaranteed to the people in the Magna Carta, and
venerated by five centuries of English common law, made an impact in the minds of the
colonists.
It is against this history, of the protection itself and its violation in the colonial era, that
we should read the clauses of the state constitutions. Many of the protective characteristics of
trial by jury are guaranteed in the state constitutions, either explicitly or implicitly.
33

Connor, 206, quoting Trevelyan’s American Revolution.
Connor, 207, quoting Trevelyan’s American Revolution.
35
Connor, 205.
36
Connor, 208, quoting Lecky.
37
Declaration of Independence
34
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Pennsylvania, as discussed, guaranteed trial by jury in cases involving property and in civil
cases. 38 The substance of the guarantee provided by the State of Virginia is the same, but its
framers burnished its clause with the word “ancient,” making clear the long legacy of trial by
jury. 39 Delaware does not explicitly guarantee trial by jury in civil cases, saying only that
freemen “ought to have remedy by the course of the law of the land… speedily without delay,”
but jury trial is implied as the next clause states, “that trial by jury of facts where they arise is
one of the greatest securities of the lives, liberties, and estates of the people.” 40 These excerpts
indicate that framers of state constitutions had internalized the importance of trial by jury, proven
by history and personal experience, and sought to instill it in their states. It is also clear that
authors of state constitutions thought it important to protect property and wanted to do so by
extending the right to trial by jury to cases explicitly considering property.
An examination of jury trial guarantees in criminal trials further contextualizes FoundingEra views of property. While it may not seem to be the case, the definition of crimes was
intimately connected to property. Blackstone writes that, “felony, in the general acceptation of
our English law, comprizes every species of crime, which occasioned at common law the
forfeiture of lands or goods.”41 This would have been most crimes, especially when property
forfeiture began to be substituted for capital punishment.42 In the 17th and 18th centuries, many

38

“Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776,” Clause XI.
“Virginia Declaration of Rights,” Clause XI.
40
“Delaware Declaration of Rights,” Sect. 13.
41
“Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England Book the Fourth - Chapter the Seventh: Of Felonies,
Injurious to the King's Perogative,” Avalon Project, accessed December 11, 2018,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/blackstone_bk4ch7.asp, pg. 94.
42
“Blackstone - Of Felonies, Injurious to the King’s Perogative,” pg. 95; Actually, Blackstone says that crimes
punished by capital punishment are also felonies because in the act of being executed, the convicted “in some degree
or other” forfeits his property. Naturally, however, this is a secondary concern; a man’s property interest is
diminished, it seems, when he is also at risk of losing his head.
39
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crimes could be punished with death as an extreme deterrent against committing them. 43
According to Blackstone, even petty larceny could be considered a felony “as they subject the
committers of them to forfeitures” 44 when caught.
Additionally, despots in history used conviction for a trumped-up crime to take property
from enemies and enrich the state, and it’s natural that the Americans would have sought to
prevent a similar practice in their nascent governments. As discussed earlier, the law that would
have charged Americans and transported them to England for trial not only “continually
harrassed the subject(s)” but also “shamefully inriched the crown,” according to Blackstone. 45
Moreover, Henry VIII was not deploying a new tactic; in Ancient Rome, as well, emperors
would use the practice of proscription, declaring specific Romans enemies of the state, to
persecute political enemies and fill the state’s coffers.
In the state constitutions, the requirements for trial by jury in criminal cases are more
extensive than those for civil disputes. While state constitutions only required the institution of
trial by jury and no more in civil cases, most states granted defendants the right to a jury
composed of members “of his vicinage” (local to him) who had to agree unanimously in order to
render a guilty verdict. Without an understanding of the common law link between crimes and
property forfeiture, we may think that this discrepancy implies more concern on the part of state
framers over criminal proceedings than over cases specifically to do with property. However,
backed with the knowledge of the linkage between the two, it is apparent that jury guarantees in
criminal trials were implicitly protections of property rights.
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Again, we see how the natural right to protect property was deeply intertwined with other
natural rights to enjoy life and liberty and pursue happiness. It may not have been the case that
authors of state constitutions held as a primary concern the protection of property in criminal
cases. However, the strenuous requirements for criminal procedure, the magnitude of which was
defined by the consequences to the perpetrator’s property, indicate how seriously states wanted
to protect the innocent from any unjust loss of liberty or property.
The cumulative effect of jury requirement in cases concerning property and criminal
trials was to protect defendants from unjust losses of property. Colonial-era legislators were
very concerned with ensuring that defendants could request a jury trial, believing that a jury
filled with impartial peers was the best way to ensure a fair hearing. The denial to the colonists
of that ancient right, guaranteed first to Englishmen in the Magna Carta and developed in
common law for centuries, imprinted in their mind the importance of guaranteeing trial by jury.
If the colonists agreed with Blackstone that “the impartial administration of justice, which
secures both our persons and our properties, is the great end of civil society,” 46 then they
believed that one of the most important ways to do this was to guarantee trial by jury.

Anti-Takings Clauses
State constitutions also frequently assert that government may not take private property
for public use without the consent of the owner or his legal representative. For instance,
Massachusetts’ Constitution says, “no part of the property of any individual can, with justice, be
taken from him, or applied to public uses, without his own consent, or that of the representative
body of the people,”47 and many other constitutions surveyed say the same. In this section, I
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explore how state constitution authors likely understood anti-takings provisions and identify the
theories of property rights that undergird those provisions. Furthermore, I discuss Blackstone’s
documentation of similar English provisions, Locke’s conception of property, and a republican
interpretation of the topic. Finally, I consider the relative lack of compensation-for-takings
guarantees in the state constitutions and present two explanations for their absence. While at
first the anti-takings clauses in state constitutions appear to be hard prohibitions against
nonconsensual takings, the reality is, as always, much more interesting.
Blackstone’s Commentaries, as the authoritative source on the meaning of English
common law, are useful to my analysis because they were no less - perhaps even more authoritative in the 18th century. 48 In his chapter titled “Of the Absolute Rights of Individuals,”
he says of private property:
“the third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, is that of
property: which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of
all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only
by the laws of the land. The original of private property is
probably founded in nature...The laws of England are therefore, in
point of honor and justice, extremely watchful in ascertaining and
protecting this right.
So great moreover is the regard of the law for private property, that
it will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the
general good of the whole community.” 49

There are several points to make about this passage. First, Blackstone terms the property
right “absolute,” according it superior protection to later rights discussed by Blackstone which
are “subordinate.” The three absolute rights of Englishmen listed, the right to personal security,
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personal liberty, and private property, are “founded on nature and reason, so they are coeval with
our form of government; though subject at time to fluctuate and change.” 50 In saying that they
are coeval, or contemporaneous, with the establishment of the British government, Blackstone
means that they were established in the Magna Carta, “the great charter of liberties, which was
obtained, sword in hand, from king John…” 51 These liberties, he wants to make clear, were
developed and reaffirmed in common law and statute over hundreds of years and deserve the
highest protection.
This treatment of property accords with the American conception of the property right as
a fundamental natural right. As discussed, the Americans called the property right “unalienable”
and in doing so asserted that it was one of the most basic rights that could be possessed by man. 52
For both Blackstone and
The difference, if it is even significant, can be explained by the parties’ differences in
purpose: Jefferson had a political goal whereas Blackstone had a descriptive goal. For example,
the Declaration of Independence was intended to justify the American Revolution, and it
established political principles the colonists used to justify their actions. The state constitutions
built on this foundation, and, in reiterating these principles, ingrained them in their states and
future laws. Blackstone was instead focused on describing the traditions of British common law
and explaining that the three rights listed held a position of primary importance in the law. Thus,
while an “absolute” right is technically different than an “unalienable” right, the difference is
immaterial in the question of what both authors wanted to imply; they wanted to imply that
property rights were based in an authority higher than man and should be accorded the highest
protections.
50

“Blackstone - Of the Absolute Rights of Individuals,” pg. 123.
“Blackstone - Of the Absolute Rights of Individuals,” pg. 123.
52
Declaration of Independence
51

24

Second, it is clear that English common law sought to provide the highest protections for
the property right. In no instance does the law allow for the state to take property without an
owner’s consent, even if the public benefit is great. In showing this, Blackstone gives an
example of a road, proposed to be built, that would require the land of a private person for its
construction. “In vain may it be urged, that the good of the individual ought to yield to that of
the community,” he says. Such a line of reasoning would run contrary to the very notion of “the
public good,” he says, which “is in nothing more essentially interested, than in the protection of
every individual’s private rights.”53 That is, the dichotomy between an individual’s interest and
the community’s interest is a false one; the latter is composed of the former, so the former should
always win, and certainly in the case of property.
This is as strict of a conception of an anti-takings prohibition possible - while the state
constitutions allowed for takings if an owner’s legislature acquiesced, English common law did
not. The case of takings is different than even taxation in support of the state or war, which can
be imposed by “his representatives in parliament” without explicit, private consent. 54 To
reiterate, it is clear that the absolute right of property received the most strenuous protections
under English common law.
It’s also clear that Blackstone’s treatment of property rights is very similar to Locke’s
discussion of the same topic because both men state that God’s provision of the earth to men in
common as the basis for property rights. When introducing “the third absolute right” of
property, he says it is “probably founded in nature”55 and later explains that “the only true and
solid foundation of man’s dominion over external things” is that “the all-bountiful creator gave
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to man ‘ dominion over all the earth’,” quoting Genesis.56 Such a phrase will be familiar to any
student of Locke who likewise declared “it is very clear, that God… has given the earth to the
children of men; given it to mankind in common.” 57 For both authors, the original grant of all
the earth from God to all men in common is the basis upon which man can claim any property
right. While the authors later diverge in their conception of how property may be transferred, 5859
they share in common their belief that property rights are derived from God’s actions.
If Blackstone was influenced by Locke, it is likely that the authors of state constitutions
were were likewise influenced. Indeed, that seems to be the case. The anti-takings protections
from state constitutions read almost as summaries of Locke’s political philosophy regarding the
origins and purposes of government, in the first place. Libertarian legal scholar Richard Epstein
is helpful in explaining this case.
Epstein reads from Locke’s Second Treatise a dual justification for the maintenance of
law and order. While Locke doesn’t say so explicitly, Epstein identifies “a linguistic switch
from the idea of consent (which may be implied in fact, as from a course of conduct) to the idea
of being bound because one receives in return the benefit of state protection.”60 The switch
Epstein references occurs in Section 119 when Locke says that what binds a man to obey the
laws of government is “tacit consent.” Locke would prefer explicit consent, but that is only
present when men leave the state of nature and enter into political compact in the first instance. 61
People would do this because, while free in the state of nature, the enjoyment of such liberty is
56
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only ensured under a government.62 After this initial expression of consent, however, Locke
must rely on tacit consent, which is far less powerful.
According to Epstein, Locke establishes a person’s tacit consent based on his enjoyment
“of any parts of the dominions of any government.”63 This is actually, in Epstein’s view, an
argument based on benefits received. Because a man avails himself of or, no less persuasive,
receives the benefits of state protection and services, he is bound to follow the laws of the
government. Epstein labels this system “a theory of restitution for benefits conferred.” 64
Because members of a society receive benefits from a government, they develop a corresponding
obligation to follow the rules of the government.
Locke offers two reasons as to why men could be bound to follow the laws of a just
society. First, they could be bound by giving their own explicit consent, but this is only possible
at the onset of society, far removed from us, today, or any of the thinkers discussed. In the
American example, explicit consent was reserved for the Founding generation, or in the case of
state governments... Members of an existing society give what equates to tacit consent by
receiving the benefits of society. Because they benefit, they have an obligation to support the
state. In this way, they tacitly consent to laws and are bound by them. In modern times, all
American citizens are bound by tacit consent. By driving on roads and enjoying the protection
of a national military, we tacitly consent to governance...
Locke’s theories of consent and property rights are expressed in the anti-takings clauses
of the state constitutions. Reconsider the full anti-takings clause from the constitution of
Massachusetts:
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“Each individual of the society has a right to be protected by it in
the enjoyment of his life, liberty and property, according to
standing laws. He is obliged, consequently, to contribute his share
to the expense of this protection; to give his personal service, or an
equivalent, when necessary: but no part of the property of any
individual can, with justice, be taken from him, or applied to public
uses, without his own consent, or that of the representative body of
the people. In fine, the people of this commonwealth are not
controllable by any other laws than those to which their
constitutional representative body have given their consent.”65
This excerpt is almost a perfect expression of Locke’s political theory. The first sentence
gives the primary reason for entering into government: the enjoyment of one’s natural rights.
Because the individual receives such benefits, “he is obliged, consequently” to contribute to the
society and follow its laws. Next enters the protection against nonconsensual government
takings, although it is more lenient than Locke’s absolute clause. The excerpt closes with an
explicit requirement of individual consent as given by a citizen’s representative. These
similarities make clear that the state constitutions and thus the Founders were influenced by
Locke’s political philosophy and his original reasons for the formation of government.
Additionally, this thinking was connected intimately to protections of personal property,
particularly in ensuring that citizens were protected from nonconsensual government takings.
There are two important points to make. First, it may seem to modern readers that the
property protections in Locke and the state constitutions are conflating different things. Whether
citizens are required to follow all laws appears to be a more general subject than specific
“property” protections in anti-takings clauses. In fact, the two themes are intimately related.
Locke himself, when discussing the first goals of political society wrote of society’s “mutual
preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name, property.” 66
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Property to Locke (and, as I will show later, to Madison) was a general concept. It included, of
course, things that could be traded, valued, and exchanged as in the modern meaning of the
word. But the word - and, more importantly, the concept - could be used to describe things more
intrinsic to people: their general rights, their safety, their talents, etc.
As such, for Locke, protections for a man’s property right were intrinsically connected to
protections for other “rights” in our modern conception and therefore to the first reasons for
forming political society. Locke would not have argued, for example, that men could establish a
political society and simultaneously ignore property rights (indeed, he said so). 67 In the state
constitutions, “property” was probably meant to be read in its narrow sense, but the point
remains that property protections were fundamentally connected to the purposes of political
society generally for Locke and his American successors.
In contrast to Locke, however, the state constitutions do not contain the same absolute
prohibition against government takings that Locke prescribed. The states allow for takings with
the consent of the legislature. In practice, Locke’s prohibition against takings was too strict to be
workable. Under Locke’s absolute protection, any citizen could impede the function of the state
at will based on a claim of individual right. While die-hard liberals may applaud such a
protection, the state constitutions did not. They made a compromise between liberal right and
the basic functioning of the government, allowing for the government to take individual property
with the consent of the legislature.
It may be that the authors of the state constitutions were extending an admission of
unworkability that Blackstone himself made. First, recall that individual consent was not a
bulwark against taxation in English common law. Perhaps because of their broad application to
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all people, instead of the specific, individual nature of eminent domain seizure, taxes were
government takings of a different sort and could be imposed by an Englishman’s representatives
in parliament.68
But Blackstone also described a Parliamentary role in eminent domain itself. When
Parliament feels there is a public good to be gained by state ownership of a piece of private
property, Blackstone says, “the legislature alone, can, and indeed frequently does, interpose, and
compel the individual to acquiesce.” This is not carried out by “absolutely stripping the subject
of his property in an arbitrary manner,” which would be a violation of absolute right. Blackstone
continues, “all that the legislature does is oblige the owner to alienate his possessions for a
reasonable price; and even this is an exertion of power, which the legislature indulges with
caution.”69 This mechanism is essentially equivalent to Parliament facilitating a sale of property
and pressuring the owner by leveraging the persuasive power of public exigency. Thus, the story
told at the beginning of this section is not entirely true; while Blackstone and the state
constitutions stressed the importance of property rights and characterized them as deserving the
highest protections, they also acknowledged that an absolute prohibition on government takings
à la Locke was undesirable.
This apparent rejection of liberalism may lead some to contend, as Dean William Treanor
does, that a republican worldview, not a liberal one, influenced the construction of the
Constitution’s Takings Clause. If he is right, then it was the case that “many of the framers
believed that government could - and in the interests of society often should - limit individuals’
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free use of their property.” 70 Treanor’s theory offers an alternative explanation for why there
were not absolute prohibitions against takings in state constitutions. Under Treanor’s
interpretation of the Founder’s political philosophy, there would be no reason to expect such a
prohibition in the first place as the Founders’ primary goal was to cultivate republican virtue
instead of implementing liberal protections of natural rights.
Treanor continues, “republicans have a profoundly ambivalent stance toward private
property. Believing that the purpose of the state was to promote virtue, they saw sources of
corruption in luxury and in commerce” which required, at times, correction by the state.71 That
is not to say that republicans didn’t think property was important - they did. However, they
believed that a certain level of property was important insofar as it provided the financial
freedom to a citizen to participate fully in public life. They did not believe in the absolute
importance of property as Locke did, valuing instead the cultivation of virtue by the state, to
which property would need to be at times subservient.
Treanor’s thesis finds little support in the state constitutions, at least. Vermont’s
constitution most closely aligns with his argument when it says “that private property ought to be
subservient to public uses, when necessity requires it.”72 This clause points toward an
underlying motivation of communitarianism that could feasibly be motivated by republican
thought. However, communitarianism is not the same as republicanism; rather, it is actually
compatible with Lockean liberalism. Such a clause is a restatement of the benefits received
justification for assent to law already discussed. Expressed, again, is the logic that because
people receive protection and benefits from the government, they are bound to contribute their
70
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share (in property or service). Vermont went further in encouraging communitarianism than
other states such as Massachusetts, but it is still hard to roundly say such a clause is republican.
As to the current project, then, there is little evidence for Treanor’s thesis in the state
constitutions.

32

Chapter 2 - Madison and Jefferson
Analyzing the state constitutions reveals that the states held property in high regard and
intended to provide significant protections for citizens’ property rights. States declared the
property right to be one of the bundle of basic, natural rights to which all men were entitled,
consistent with the ideas expressed in the Declaration of Independence. Moreover, they
intended to protect property against political abuse. By guaranteeing to citizens trial by jury in
civil and criminal cases, states ensured that any forced forfeiture of property would be preceded
by a neutral legal process. Additionally, provisions prohibiting nonconsensual government
takings of private property were strict and seen as deeply connected with the first reasons for
government as provided by Locke’s liberalism.
My project in this paper is to understand both how property is protected in the
Constitution and what educated people thought about the importance of property rights,
especially vis-a-vis political and social rights, far more popular today. To that end, in this
chapter I examine the personal writings of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson. While neither
of the three can represent the precise views of all Americans, I hope to capture the prevailing
sentiments regarding property at the time of the Founding given the two subjects’ political
influence and, as I will show, diverse ideologies.

James Madison
James Madison is often cast as the strongest defender of property rights on philosophical
grounds.73 Walter Berns is perhaps the author most susceptible to overstating Madison’s
promotion of strict property rights, saying, “It is almost as if Madison were arguing (in The
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Federalist 10) were arguing that the first object of government is to promote an unequal
distribution of wealth.” 74 While it is true that the learned Madison was conscious, like Jefferson
and Hamilton, of the philosophical justifications for the right to property, his primary
contribution was in creating institutions for the protection of all rights, of which property rights
in particular were indistinct. For Madison, property was a right deserving of no more and no less
protection than any other right possessed by man. While he recognized that property was a right
often threatened by the dangerous mechanisms present in republics - factions, short-sighted
passions, and pernicious emotion - the strategies he devised to protect property were no different
than the structures meant to protect men generally. This was a product of his own political
philosophy which, again, saw property as indistinct from any other right.
Understanding Madison’s conception of property rests on applying faithfully Madison’s
own definition of property which he explicated in a 1792 National Gazette article. At the head of
the article, Madison wrote:
“This term in its particular application means "that dominion
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the
world, in exclusion of every other individual." In its larger and
juster meaning, it embraces every thing to which a man may attach
a value and have a right; and which leaves to every one else the
like advantage. In the former sense, a man's land, or merchandize,
or money is called his property. In the latter sense, a man has a
property in his opinions and the free communication of them.
[...]
In a word, as a man is said to have a right to his property, he may
be equally said to have a property in his rights.”75
Madison’s second, broader definition, which he employs for the rest of the article, means
something different than how the word is used today (e.g. when saying “property rights”). It was
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also different from the common use meaning in the Founding Era; Madison’s use of the word is
particular to his article. In Madison’s thinking, the concept of property is general. It
encompasses anything in which a man can have an interest. Some other examples of property
interests that Madison provides are safety, liberty, free use of faculties, conscience, choice of
occupation, and others.
The article, framed by Madison’s broader definition of property, reveals the complexity
of Madison’s thought. First, it shows that Madison saw property (as conceived of today) as no
different in character than other rights someone may have. For instance, says Madison, a
government which protects its citizens’ ownership of things but simultaneously violates the
rights of citizens to their “opinions, their religion, their persons, and their faculties” should be
condemned. 76 Set in modern terms, a government that protects property rights should protect
just as strenuously other economic, social, and political rights. For Madison, too, the converse is
also true - a government that protects economic, social, and political rights must also protect
property rights. Thus, the property right is no more and no less important than any other right.
All are important and should be protected by the state or other means.
Madison’s article also intimates that he saw property rights as essentially connected to
the person. The subjects of economic, political, and social rights - who to marry, what to say,
how to act, when to work, etc. - are qualities and decisions intrinsic to someone. They are, in a
twist, properties that define who the person is and is not. Physical property appears, to many, to
be different. In the common conception, it is seen as something external, only connected to a
person by the chance of possession. However, when Madison says that property rights are no
different in character than other rights, he implies that the objects being protected are no
different, either. Thus, citizens’ “free use of their faculties, and free choice of their occupations”
76
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should be protected not only because they are property in the general sense but also because
“they are the means of acquiring property strictly called.” 77 Property rights, in Madison’s view,
protect the fruits of a person’s labor (the things external), but at a more basic level, they the
exercise of a person’s natural character - the labor itself.

Thomas Jefferson
For Jefferson, a largely equal distribution of property was most conducive to republican
government. Conscious, like Madison, that an unstructured democracy could easily produce
poor public policy, creating an equality of interests was essential in Jefferson’s mind. Equality
of interests meant roughly equal land holdings and preferably agrarian lots. The aristocracies of
Europe would have no place in the new America, and, likewise, the corruption produced by
extreme wealth would not exist in the new lands. Finally, Jefferson thought, there was
opportunity for every man to own a small farm himself. There was opportunity for every man to
own a small farm himself. The seemingly endless abundance of America provided a perfect
opportunity to implement an egalitarian society that was impossible to conceive of in Europe.
Jefferson’s aversion to aristocracy was likely developed in part by his time spent as
ambassador to France during the Confederation period. While touring his host country in 1785,
he encountered in his travels a poor French woman. Destitute, the mother of two children, and
without food and employment, he was struck at the extent of inequality in France and the
injustice of such a situation. In a letter to James Madison, he expressed his frustration with
wealth inequality and gave his thoughts on how legislators might rectify the issue.
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The principle problem for Jefferson was the capture of land by the wealthy. This land
was left uncultivated and primarily used for hunting. To Jefferson this presented an absurdity: “I
asked myself what could be the reason that so many should be permitted to beg who are willing
to work, in a country where there is a very considerable proportion of uncultivated lands?” In
the first place, it seemed unjust to him that the poor were left without work when there was
clearly an opportunity to do so. In the second, it seemed to him foolish, as well. Uncultivated
land represented untapped opportunity for “the increase of (the landowners’) revenues by
permitting these lands to be laboured.” Finally, and significantly for my investigation, it was an
abuse of natural right. “It is clear,” he wrote, “that the laws of property have been so far
extended as to violate natural right.”
Jefferson’s last statement is distinctive because it reveals that he believed there to be a
limit to the natural right to property. This runs contrary to the line of thinking started by Locke
and cultivated by Blackstone’s common law history of the right to property which was termed
“absolute” and could never be violated by the state. It’s particularly startling because it appears
that Jefferson agrees with Locke’s basic arguments for the development of property. The ideas
and phraseology used by Jefferson mimics those of Locke. For instance, Jefferson’s second
objection, that the enclosure of fertile land by the rich is foolish, is analogous to Locke’s value
theory of property. In the theory, Locke explains that a person who labors on a piece of land
deserves a property right over that land because the vast majority of the land’s new value is a
product of the person’s labor.78 Jefferson seems to agree that improving the value of land should
be a primary reason for why someone would take ownership of a piece of land. That the wealthy
landowners do not care about the potential value of their uncultivated land is an oversight, in
Jefferson’s view.
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Additionally, the way in which Jefferson talks about land mimics the language of
Blackstone and Locke. Recall that both authors believed that property rights originated from
God’s grant of the earth to all men. Locke, when talking about this process wrote, “God gave the
world to men in common… it cannot be supposed he meant it should always remain common
and uncultivated.”79 Jefferson, in explaining why it was that the natural right to property has
surpassed its original bounds, said, “the earth is given as a common stock for man to labour and
live on.”80 The similarities in language indicate that Jefferson is reiterating to Madison the ideas
of Locke. Moreover, there is definitive evidence that Jefferson was at least conscious of Locke’s
writings. In an 1825 letter to Henry Lee, Jefferson explained that the Declaration was intended
“not to find out new principles, or new arguments, never before thought of… all it’s authority
rests then on the harmonising sentiments of the day… Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Sidney Etc.”81
Jefferson’s own acknowledgment, combined with the linguistic and ideological similarities,
imply that Jefferson had adopted the basic arguments to do with creation of property first
articulated by Locke.
Jefferson appears to break with Locke in his recommendations of the proper legislative
response to the unequal divisions of land present in 18th-century France. Saying that “the
consequences of this enormous inequality producing so much misery to the bulk of mankind,
legislators cannot invent too many devices for subdividing property,” Jefferson imagined two
solutions to the unjust enclosure of land by the French aristocracy: a system of progressive
taxation and the elimination of primogeniture .82 These two state policies, if implemented (and
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Jefferson did advocate for the elimination of primogeniture and saw it passed in Virginia 83),
would run contrary to Locke’s strong protections for property rights, already discussed in the
previous chapter. Stanley Katz remarks that this represented a radical, redistributive line of
thinking.84 Jefferson’s policy recommendations are essential in understanding his view of the
proper place of property, but, contrary to some scholars, I think that Jefferson’s views were
entirely compatible with Locke’s view of property and that they represent a distinctly republican,
but faithful interpretation of Locke’s theory of property.
Again, Jefferson’s most ambitious claim in his October 1785 letter to James Madison is
that, given the situation in France, “it is clear that the laws of property have been so far extended
as to violate natural right.” As I have shown, Jefferson believed the natural right to be the right
of all men to labor upon the earth, which was granted to humanity in common by God. The
purpose of this grant is to improve the land and to extract from it the basic sustenance and
additional product of industry which each man may derive according to his talents. 85 Thus, the
enclosure of the land, left uncultivated solely for the use of sport, by the French aristocracy is not
only foolish but unjust - the purpose of enclosure is contrary to the purpose given by God. This
is the way in which Jefferson believed natural right to have been violated.
The important point to make is that Jefferson thought his recommendation for state force
justified because it was in response to a violation of the proper process of property acquisition.
Jefferson believed that there was a defined purpose for which property could be acquired. When
this was not followed, it was appropriate for the state to make a correction.
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Additionally, Jefferson’s view on this matter was compatible with a view he expressed
later in his life and which mirrored again a Lockean idea about property. In an 1816 letter to
French expat Pierre Samuel du Pont de Nemours, Jefferson expressed that, in his view, the right
to property existed only “without violating the similar rights of other sensible beings; that no one
has a right to obstruct another…”86 This line of thought is a reiteration of one half of Locke’s
famous proviso that appropriation of God’s common grant to man is only allowed “at least where
there is enough, and as good, left in common for others.” 87 This means that the exercise of one
man’s right may not prejudice the same right of another. In this case, the proviso enters as
another reason for why the French aristocracy’s enclosure of land was unjust and exhausted the
natural right. In doing so simultaneous with the existence of landless, penniless (more
accurately, sous-less), unemployed peasants, their enclosure of land was, as Locke would term it,
“a prejudice to any other man.”88
Jefferson’s conception of republican land ownership is thus informed by his
understanding of the reasons for property acquisition. Recall that Jefferson’s ideal was that all
citizens own a small amount of land. Property acquired for the narrow purposes prescribed by
Locke would only result in small-lot farms. Large holdings, ironically, given Jefferson’s own
possessions, would be pointless and actually contrary to the initial purposes of property. His
views on property acquisition also likely informed his exaltation of rural life and condemnation
of urban centers and commerce. Farming and working with physical land was for Jefferson
intimately connected with a purpose that descended from God himself.
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Chapter 3 - The Constitution
In Chapter 1, I showed how the precursors to the federal constitution, the state
constitutions, included protections for property rights, and I also discussed the history and
significance such clauses had in the Revolutionary era and prior. In Chapter 2, I discussed the
political thought of Madison and Jefferson, two of the most important figures behind the
Constitution. However, Madison and Jefferson, while certainly influential at the time, are only
two figures amidst the vast array of other thinkers who considered the Constitution when it was
written.
This chapter discusses the broader dialogue at the time of the Founding and also
identifies areas in which property is protected by our federal Constitution by examining the
Constitutional Convention, Bill of Rights89, and contemporaneous publications such as The
Federalist, among other things. I begin by discussing the events of the Revolutionary and
Confederation periods, bridging the gap between 1776 and 1789 and showing that the Founding
Fathers became increasingly worried over the period that rights, including and especially
property rights, were not adequately protected in the Confederation. Next, I identify the broad,
structural protections for rights, which the Federalists thought fully protected each citizen’s
personal rights, including the property right. Finally, I talk about the fate of the three clauses
identified in Chapter 1, two of which are included in the Constitution through the Bill of Rights.
Ultimately, property rights enjoyed no privileged position in the Constitution or the documents
produced discussing property rights. This mimics the Federalist perspective that the property
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right was no different in character than any other right, and it is contrary to the modern view that
economic rights are relatively less important than political and social rights.

The Revolutionary and Confederation Periods
Given the protections for property in state constitutions discussed in Chapter 1, it would
be reasonable to assume that property rights were well-respected by the states between 1776 and
1789. Actually, as James Ely writes, “experience soon demonstrated that state safeguards for
property were inadequate.”90 During the Revolutionary War and after, state governments failed
to protect property rights, most frequently those of the British and of creditors (and if you were a
British creditor, well…).
From the very start of the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress encouraged
states to seize the property of Loyalists for the public benefit. Although justified on the grounds
that Loyalists were engaged in treason against the United States and that their possessions were
thus subject to forfeiture, the danger to property rights was not lost on the Framers-to-be.91 After
the war, as Brits fought fruitlessly in states to recoup their losses, prominent Founders stepped in
to help. Alexander Hamilton defended a British merchant from having to pay restitution for the
occupancy of land during the British invasion of New York City, and James Madison helped
pass a Virginia law that prevent further confiscation of British property. 92
The danger the states presented to rights of property was emphasized when the military
seized the property of non-Loyalists for use in fighting the War. John Jay wrote to the legislature
of New York in 1778 objecting to “the Practice of impressing Horses, Teems, and Carriages by
the military, without the intervention of a civil Magistrate, and without any Authority from the
90
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Law of the Land.”93 General Washington, too, acknowledged the “many abuses” and ordered
that “no horse be impressed by any member of the army, without an order therefor from the Q
Mr General…’94
Still, it was not only the direct government seizure of property, against which the antitakings provisions in the states were clearly ineffectual, that concerned prominent Americans.
Of particular concern were schemes during the Confederation period to alleviate debtors of their
burdens by printing paper money. In Virginia, which had in the 1770s claimed the debts of
British creditors then prevented them from filing suit in court, James Madison spoke against a
law to print paper money. 95 Paper money had been used in Virginia in the pre-Revolutionary
Era, but the notes functioned as small-amount bonds that were paid off by state revenue later.96
The law that Madison opposed was different. It would have had the effect of relieving debtors of
their burden at the expense of the creditors, representing an explicit violation of property rights. 97
In debate, he equated the printing of paper money to “taking away equal value in land” and also
pointed out that in so doing the legislature was violating the state’s trial by jury clause which
stated, “That in controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, the ancient
trial by jury is preferable to any other, and ought to be held sacred.” 9899
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The clearest example of the endangerment of property in the Confederation period was
Shays’ Rebellion. More commonly discussed as the event that revealed the weakness of the
federal government under the Articles of Confederation, it was prompted by farmers angry that
the Massachusetts Legislature had declined to issue paper money. Led by the revolution’s
namesake Daniel Shays, armed farmers in western Massachusetts shut down local courthouses,
preventing them from enforcing the debts they wanted relieved by the printing of paper
money. 100 The rebellion also prompted George Washington to write to Henry Lee “Let us have
(a government) by which our lives, liberties, and properties will be secured, or let us know the
worst at once.”101 The Constitutional Convention was convened the next summer.

Structural Protections
The first way in which property was protected by the new republic was in the general
construction of the government. The Founders were careful to construct a system that would
protect citizens’ property rights when the state or political process turned against them. This
project was driven by an understanding that in a representative democracy, individual rights are
endangered by one’s fellow citizens, not necessarily the government itself. Abuses by states in
the Confederation period confirmed for the Founders the importance of protecting in the
essential structure of the new government each citizen’s rights.
When people believe their rights to be infringed upon today, they often seek protection
by federal power, and many Supreme Court cases enlarging the scope of individual rights have
done so by overturning state laws (e.g. Brown v. Board, Roe v. Wade, Obergefell v. Hodges, and
others). However, all states, like the nation, have a republican form of government with a
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written constitution and guarantees of rights. Is there any reason, then, to think that the federal
government is more just or that it will protect individual rights better than any state?
Madison put this question to Thomas Jefferson in October of 1788, writing, “(if) a
majority when united by a common interest or passion can not be restrained from oppressing the
minority, what remedy can be found in a republican Government, where the majority must
ultimately decide?”102 The answer, he said, was “giving such an extent to its sphere, that no
common interest or passion will be likely to unite a majority of the whole number in an unjust
pursuit.”103 Inevitably, the citizens of a polity will be different in politically determinative ways.
In character, interest, birthright, faculty, industriousness, religion, opinion, and many other
things, people will disagree about public issues. In a small republic, these diversities are limited
and it is too easy for a majority to form and maintain power. In a large republic, diversities
would be more numerous and coalitions would shift more frequently. This mechanism would be
enhanced in the representative democracy of the United States as those chosen by “a great
number of citizens in the large than in the small republic” would more likely be meritorious
people of character instead of people who “practice with success the vicious arts by which
elections are too often carried.” 104 It is easier to trick 400 people than 40,000.
Madison’s genius insight was that, in contrast to the monarchical regime from which the
colonists had rebelled, the body that threatens the rights of a citizen in a republic is not a despotic
ruler but the people themselves. “Acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of the
major number of the constituents,” he said, present the greatest danger to an individual’s
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security, freedom, and fortune, not the despotic decrees of a single sovereign. 105 The very nature
of a democratic government is that the majority rules. The Founders recognized this and saw the
extended republic of the United States as a superior protection for individual rights than the
small republics in the states.
The Founders trusted in the moderating effect of an extended republic, but they also
established structural blockades against majoritarian oppression should such a danger arise.
These included separating government power into three coequal branches, 106 ensuring judicial
independence,107 and granting to the President the legislative veto,108 among other things. The
purpose of these constructions was to disperse the powers of the federal government across
multiple bodies such that different officials and offices could stop unjust laws at any time. These
powers are substantial (Publius called the executive veto “constitutional arms” with which to
fight back against an intrusive legislature109), and they were intended to be. “What is
government,” asked Publius, “but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were
angels, no government would be necessary.” 110 But men are not angels, and the Founders not
only thought it necessary to have government but to have a government resistant to the
oppression of popular majorities often exercised through the legislative branch.
Of course, none of these structures ensures the protection of property rights specifically.
The Founders did not, in debate or in writing, say of a policy such as checks and balances, “oh
wow, we should do this so that property is protected.” However, in the past two chapters, it has
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been clear that the Founding Fathers, whether in their capacity as authors and legislators in the
states during the Confederation period or exchanging letters on their own, considered property to
be a right of the same nature as any other. Therefore, in desiring to protect rights of citizens
generally, they were protecting property rights specifically. The violations of property preceding
the Constitutional Convention strengthen this argument by suggesting that property violations
were on the mind of the men drafting and imagining these governmental structures.

The Bill of Rights
The late Justice Antonin Scalia, testifying in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
related to the members an exercise in which he liked to engage when giving speeches around the
country. “I ask them, ‘What do you think is the reason that America is such a free country?’
‘What is it in our Constitution that makes us what we are?’,” he said. Their answers often cited
protections in the Bill of Rights. This, he contended, was inaccurate: “I tell them, if you think
that a bill of rights is what sets us apart, you're crazy. Every banana republic in the world has a
bill of rights…. the real key to the distinctiveness of America,” he concluded, “is the structure of
our government."111
The Founders, or, at least, the Federalists who shepherded the Constitution through the
ratification process, would have agreed. They opposed a Bill of Rights on the grounds that, first,
it was unnecessary because rights were already adequately protected by the structure of
government established in the Constitution, 112 and, second, it would actually hurt more than help
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by implying that rights not mentioned explicitly were not protected by the Constitution. 113
Whether the Federalists were right or wrong can certainly be debated, but in the ratification
debates over the Constitution, it was the case that the anti-Federalists called for, and persuaded
the states to do so as well, the inclusion of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution, specific
enumerations of rights to be protected from government encroachment. It is in these first ten
Amendments that the clauses protecting citizens’ right to trial by jury and right against
uncompensated government takings appear. A clause analogous to the state constitutions’
guarantee of natural right was desired by Madison but ultimately excluded from the Bill of
Rights.
Trial by jury in civil and criminal cases is protected in three clauses in the Constitution.
It is protected, most notably, in Amendments VI and VII which guarantee the right to jury trial in
criminal and civil disputes, respectively. However, trial by jury in criminal cases was guaranteed
in the Constitution before the Amendments were added in Article III Section 2 Clause 3 which
says, “The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial
shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed.” 114 The jury trial
protection in the Sixth Amendment is thus redundant. Madison, when he introduced his
proposed Amendments in Congress in 1789, conceived that the protection for jury trial would be
specifically limiting the power of the states. “It is proper that every government should be
disarmed of powers which trench upon those particular rights.” 115
Madison emerged from the Constitutional Convention uncertain of the efficacy of the
Constitution because the Convention had rejected multiple times his proposal, supported by
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James Wilson, to grants to Congress a veta on any state law passed. This would have prevented
the sorts of paper money laws and government seizure policies that Madison and others
abhorred. That the Constitution did not include such a provision was, to Madison, its greatest
weakness, and he explained this to Thomas Jefferson in his October letter cited above. 116 His
suggestion to Congress that the protection for jury trial (and freedom of conscience and the
press) be made specifically against the states represented an extension of this concern. However,
Congress again rejected his idea, instead opting for the redundancy of protecting jury trial in
criminal cases in two places. Madison would only achieve posthumously his goal of federal
oversight of state laws with the addition of the Fourteenth Amendment and the development of
the Incorporation Doctrine, which used the Fourteenth Amendment to apply the Bill of Rights to
the states.
Protections against government takings were also included in the Bill of Rights via the
Fifth Amendment, but they were much weaker than even the state constitutions. With regards to
government takings, the Fifth Amendment only says that “nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.”117 Obviously, this lacks the consent clause of the state
constitutions. Under this system, Congress or the executive could co-opt private property for
public use as long as it provides compensation. The consent and rights of the individual, so
integral to Locke’s conception of government, is a weaker bulwark against takings under the
federal Constitution than it was under the state constitutions. This is a clear shift in thinking
from the state constitutions, but, unfortunately, this author was unable to probe how that shift
came about. While this is unsatisfying to both the author and reader, there may be an
explanation on the face of the question.
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To reiterate a finding of Chapter 1, the state constitutions’ anti-takings clauses
represented a recognition of the states that the absolute prohibition on takings was unworkable.
There are instance when government seeks a legitimate public policy goal but private holdings
stand in its way. Locke, in such a situation, would side entirely with the individual and his or her
rights. The state constitutions would generally side with the individual, but allowed a
representative legislature to override the individual’s rights for the sake of efficiency. The
language of the federal Constitution implies that the Framers opted even further for efficiency
and saw no place for the bulwark of individual consent.118
Finally, the state constitution clauses which so eloquently presented man’s natural rights
are not found in the Constitution, either. This was proposed by Madison in his speech to
Congress, but it was not included. It would have said, preceding the preamble, “That government
is instituted, and ought to be exercised for the benefit of the people; which consists in the
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right of acquiring and using property, and generally of
pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.” 119 According to Goldwin, “in subsequent debate
the proposal to alter the Preamble was denounced, reviled, ridiculed, and rejected,” 120 primarily
because of its wordiness.

Conclusion
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What to make of the Constitution’s protections of property rights is unclear. The AntiFederalists demanded a Bill of Rights because they felt that the protections afforded to individual
rights were inadequate. However, they thought this was the case because the federal government
had too much power.121 Madison and the Federalists held the opposite view and thought that the
experience of the states during the Confederation period proof that state governments could not
adequately defend the rights of individuals. They also believed that by imbuing the structure of
the federal government with mechanisms of distributing power, they could protect individual
rights. It is well-recognized that the creation of the Constitution was the product of a political
compromise, and I think that this is a significant factor explaining why the Constitution doesn’t
make a distinct claim about property rights or, really, any right.
I think it is also the case that property rights were not prioritized by any party. On the
part of the Federalists, they did not believe that property rights had to be protected in ways
distinct from how rights were protected generally. The anti-Federalists, on the other hand, were
skeptical of property and would not have prioritized property rights if they had been in a position
to do so.122 However, I don’t think this diminishes the standing of property rights in the
Constitution. It is generally uncontested that the vision expressed in the Constitution is primarily
Federalist. The Federalists won ratification without changing the document, and it was James
Madison who stewarded the Bill of Rights through Congress. I think that the view that property
rights are important, yes, but no more important than other rights predominates the Constitution.
This repudiates the widespread modern view of property rights as relatively less important than
social and political rights such as freedom of speech and the right to vote, which was certainly
not instilled in the Constitution by either side.
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Conclusion
I began this paper by observing that the most controversial issues in our modern political
discourse are primarily about social and political rights. Issues of economic rights such as
property rights, liberty of contract, or labor rights are rarely discussed or are argued on a basis
other than economic right. I wondered if this dichotomy existed at our Founding - if economic
rights were seen as relatively less important (or were discussed relatively less) than social and
political rights. After my investigation in Chapters 1, 2, and 3, it’s clear that our modern
dichotomy is not an original one. If, for the Founders, some rights were relatively more
important than others, it was property rights which were considered more fundamental than
political rights such as freedom of speech, not the other way around.
In Chapter 1, I examined the state constitutions, looking for ways in which property was
protected. I identified three common clauses in which property was protected. The first is the
state constitutions’ declarations of natural right. The state constitutions mimicked the language
of the Declaration of Independence, which Jefferson drafted in the tradition of John Locke, a
pioneer of the natural rights doctrine. The states, in common, declared property - its acquisition,
possession, and protection - as a natural right. The second clause common to state constitutions
was a guarantee that no man’s property could be taken from him, whether in a civil or criminal
trial, without trial by jury. Trial by jury, an institution first guaranteed to Englishmen in the
Magna Carta, has historically been used as a protection against the tyrannous charges of kings.
Indeed, trial in a distant land with judgments passed down by strangers was a tool that King
George III sought to use against the colonists, and they listed the offence in the Declaration of
Independence. Seeking to prevent the same tactics from being used against Americans, they
included the guarantee in the state constitutions. Finally, states constitutions prevented the
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government from taking property without an owner’s consent or the consent of the legislature.
This clause also originated in the thought of Locke and is deeply connected to Locke’s first
reasons for forming political society. Locke thought that prohibitions on government takings
represented an essential part of the compact men join when entering government, and the
structure of states’ anti-takings clauses, which mirrors Locke’s argument, shows the states
understood this thought.
In Chapter 2, I examined the thought of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, two of the
most influential men between 1776 and 1791. They represent two different ways of thinking
about property. Madison defined property very broadly which was indicative of his view,
present in the Constitution, that the property right was no different from any other right.
Jefferson, in contrast, believed property to be distinct. Informed by a Lockean conception of
property, he saw property as useful because property acquisition through farming was ordained
by God. Property overall, then, was important but subordinate to the republican values that
farming was supposed to cultivate.
In Chapter 3, I turned to the Constitution itself. I examined the text of the Constitution,
the Founders’ notes, and contemporaneous publications surrounding the Constitution’s
ratification. First, it’s clear that the events of the Revolutionary and Confederation periods
convinced the Founders that property was not adequately protected under the pre-1789
government. It would not be enough to adopt a state’s constitution verbatim; new ways of
protecting property would need to be created. That’s exactly what happened as the Founders
combined ideas such as the extended republic, checks and balances, and competing
governmental powers in order to secure rights generally, and property rights specifically. The
Federalists thought the protections so strong that they pushed back against the anti-Federalists’
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calls for a Bill of Rights, thinking it unnecessary and potentially dangerous to the protection of
rights. Even so, a Bill of Rights was necessary for the ratification of the whole, and when the
first ten Amendments were added to the new Constitution, they included a protection for trial by
jury and a prohibition against nonconsensual, uncompensated government takings.
From this modest documentation of the abundance of political thought at the time of the
American founding, it’s clear that our modern conception of rights is not the same as the
Founders’ was. While the main issues of our day focus primarily on social and political rights
and economic rights are rarely discussed and often seen as less important, the Founders saw the
property right as no different in nature from other rights. In fact, at times they even considered
the property right as primary, such as when they sought to attach property requirements to
suffrage qualifications. Life, liberty and property - those “rights” were not just the things to
which people were entitled as a function of being people. They represented to the Founders the
very purposes of forming a republic in the first place, and their protection was essential in
helping citizens live fulfilling, individual lives in the pursuit of happiness.

The Change
If our modern conception of rights is divorced from the Founding conception, what could
have led to such a change? While I doubt there is only one contributing factor, it seems to me
that Footnote 4 in US v. Carolene Products, which defined for judges when laws should be ruled
unconstitutional, clearly defined the dichotomy I have discussed and afforded relatively more
judicial protection to political and social rights than to economic rights such as the right to
property.
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The facts and even the decision of Carolene Products (1938) are unremarkable. The
Court resolved the case in a 12-page decision by identifying a rational basis on which Congress
could have justified the food safety regulation that affected Carolene Products.123 What was
remarkable and impactful was Justice Harlan Stone’s 4th footnote in his majority decision, which
only four of nine judges supported (Justice Hugo Black concurred in the decision but did not
support the section on which the footnote commented). In it, he distinguished types of cases in
which heightened scrutiny could be (read: would be) required in order for a statute to be held as
constitutional. Let me explain.
If a law violates an explicit clause of the US Constitution, it is ruled unconstitutional. For
instance, Congress could clearly not make a law preventing the New York Times from printing
anti-government opinion pieces because of the First Amendment. However, in many cases,
including Carolene Products, a party will assert that a law is unconstitutional on the much
broader, vaguer grounds that a statute violates the “due process” and “equal protection” clauses
in Amendments V and XIV.124 For instance, if Congress made a law that prevented all
Claremont McKenna students from going to bed before 10 PM, that is clearly unconstitutional
even though there is no explicit clause preventing Congress from passing such a statute. The
case would be made on “due process” or “equal protection” grounds. The “rational basis” test
was developed over years of judicial precedent to decide such cases. 125
Under the “rational basis” test, courts ask whether the legislature had a “legitimate state
interest” for passing the law in question and whether there is any “rational basis” that connects
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the actual statute to the interest. If the answer to both questions is yes, then the law is presumed
constitutional, and it is a pretty easy standard to meet.126 The philosophy underlying the rational
basis test is that, in our constitutional order, the courts should defer to the political branches of
government and allow the legislative branch wide latitude in carrying out democratic
policymaking. A fundamental tension in our federal system, intended but never resolved by the
Founders, is to what extent in our representative democracy the judiciary should exercise its antidemocratic power. The rational basis test prefers leniency, overturning acts of the
democratically-elected legislature and executive only in blatant cases of illegitimate state
action. 127
Footnote 4 changed this test. Instead of awarding the wide leniency of rational basis
review to all statutes, Justice Stone suggested, and the Court subsequently adopted, that the
Court be more skeptical of a laws’ constitutionality if it either (1) “restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation” or
(2) targets “discrete and insular minorities.”128 These two situations imply stronger protection
for what I have called political and social rights, and I believe Stone’s creation of stronger
protection has led to the relatively higher value accorded political and social rights versus
economic rights today. Again, let me explain.
Stone’s first clause identified political rights as deserving of higher protection. In the
footnote, he listed a variety of different restrictions on rights to political participation that had
been adjudicated before the Court such as “restrictions upon the right to vote… restraints upon
the dissemination of information.... Interferences with political organizations… prohibition of
126
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peaceable assembly.”129 Additionally, recall that the underlying logic for deferring to the
legislature was that doing so permitted the democratic process the greatest latitude. Stone’s
footnote extended this logic by asking the courts to watch out for situations where the democratic
process lacked integrity, i.e. if certain people could not vote in an election. For Stone, the
ordinary political processes could be “relied upon to protect minorities” 130 because, as the
Founders thought, the Constitution provided for minorities (in the political, not the demographic,
sense) the tools with which to persuade majorities to change their minds. If those tools were
corrupted or denied, however, Stone thought that the courts should take notice and intercede.
Thus, Stone recommended that courts protect political rights at a higher level than traditional
rational basis deference.
Stone’s second clause is also connected to the political process and a corruption of wellfunctioning, democratic lawmaking, but its rationale points clearly towards protecting the most
controversial social rights asserted today. According to Strauss, a “discrete and insular” minority
is “‘discrete’ in the sense that they are separate in some way, identifiable as distinct from the rest
of society. They are ‘insular’ in the sense that other groups will not form coalitions with them”
because of prejudice.131 Because such minorities are unable to change policy through the
legitimate lawmaking process, Stone believes, they deserve further protection. Many of the
social issues that are adjudicated in front of the court - same sex marriage, affirmative action,
racial discrimination - are clearly derived from this thinking. Those seeking broader protections
in public or the courts cite the historic discrimination against a group as reason for expanding
protections for social rights which mirrors Stone’s second clause.
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The Carolene Products decision also came after a period in the Court’s history in which
it rejected a significant amount of the New Deal during what has been termed the Lochner period
of the court.132 Lochner ruled a law restricting work hours unconstitutional on liberty of contract
grounds (people should be able to freely enter whatever contract they want such as working more
than 60 hours per week) - a case decided on the basis of protecting an economic right. The court
during that time valued strongly economic rights such as the liberty of contract and recognized
that the prioritization of social and political rights can at times come into conflict with
individuals’ fair economic rights. After Hugo Black joined the Court and shifted the balance of
power, the Court began to place less importance in economic rights. Carolene Products is not
only representative of this shift, but it is an explicit direction to consider political and social
rights as more important than economic rights, and I think that it is a persuasive explanation for
our modern conception of the relative importance of economic, political, and social rights which
differs from that of the Founding.
While my argument is based on a Supreme Court case and uses judicial history as its
primary evidence, I don’t think that the explanatory power of my argument is limited to the
change’s effect on the courts. In our everyday life, what the courts say fundamentally impacts
what we think, how our arguments are framed, and what policies are proposed. Is there a state in
the Union that would today propose a law segregating schools based on race? No, and there
hasn’t been such a proposal for years because it has been clearly unconstitutional since Brown v.
Board of Education. Legal doctrine affects what policies are put forward and how those policies
are framed, and society changes in reaction to those policies. I am not saying that all change
starts with court decisions, which I think would be a profoundly negative process. I am saying
that people should not consider the effect of legal developments as limited in scope to the
132
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judiciary. It is my contention that the high value accorded to social and political rights, at times
at the expense of economic rights, is in part due to a footnote in an otherwise irrelevant case
from the 1930s. The distinction Justice Stone made parallels exactly the dichotomy I identified
in my Introduction, and it was a lubricant for the documented pivot the Court made from
inhibiting Progressive policy and the New Deal at the beginning of the century to protecting
minority social and political rights during the Civil Rights era. The effects of the infamous
footnote are still observable today.

The Result
This analysis matters because it reveals a blind spot in our modern political debates.
America has long been noted for its unique veneration of the Founding, and for those who
believe that the Founding Fathers were great men (despite their admitted and well-documented
flaws) who expressed timeless and exceptional political principles worthy of being followed
today, this analysis represents a wake-up call that a portion of those principles are not being
upheld. Even those who distrust or disagree with the Founders - because of their identity, their
protection of slavery, their value judgments, or whatever - can find value in understanding the
ideas that motivated this nation’s founding, the unique culture of our original people, and the
principles on which our institutions are based. When moving houses, one must know first his
own address, at least in order to direct the movers where to pick up his favorite possessions. So
too should would-be reformers understand the United States’ first principles in order to mitigate
the possibility that, in their haste to form a more perfect Union, they carelessly discard important
national heirlooms.
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